Задорожная А.Н.кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры финансов, кредита, бухгалтерского учета и аудита, Омский государственный университет путей сообщения anna_zador@mail.ru
В статье рассмотрены основные теоретические положения агентской теории с акцентом на конфликте интересов между акционерами и кредиторами компании. В качестве одного из механизмов снижения данного конфликта используются ковенанты. Приведен обзор основных классификаций ковенант, в том числе и финансовых. На основе гипотезы влияния контрактов на стоимость компании сделано предположение о зависимости ковенант и процентной ставки, а также представлен анализ работ, содержащих результаты эмпирических исследований данной гипотезы.
Ключевые слова: агентская теория, конфликт интересов, акционеры, кредиторы, активные ковенанты, пассивные ковенанты, финансовые ковенанты, гипотеза влияния контрактов на стоимость
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